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PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS
A More Efficient Administration of Justice
The wonderful development of material civilization which daily
boasts improved methods and new economies' creates a demand
for corresponding progress in the administration of all departments of the government. There is no more reason for inefficiency in managing a state than in operating an industry. The
judicial system of both state and nation is as worthy of creative
enterprise as are the instruments of commerce.
The attainment of justice is an ideal which men have pursued
with unending quest. However remote may be the realization of
this end it has inspired unceasing effort to improve the substance
of the law and the processes through which it is applied. Recent
years have been most fruitful in suggestions for change in both
basic and procedural law. While there has been much professional
discussion of these proposals, their consideration has been more
or less fragmentary. It therefore has seemed that at the beginning
of our deliberations at this meeting we may with profit survey the
existing judicial order and the need, character and possible effect of certain of the plans, proposals and movements for its
improvement.
Several factors are involved in the administration of justice.
The first to be considered of course is the law which must be administered. To assure their just and certain application fundamental principles must be settled beyond cavil. Though our substantive law, both civil and criminal, has been in the making since
the very beginning of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, it still is more
involved and complex than need be. The number of decisions of
courts of last resort has been constantly increasing. There is
respectable judicial authority for almost every conceivable view
of the law applicable to a given state of facts. The greater the
number of litigated cases, the more difficult it has become to reconcile the authorities, the greater the resulting dilemma of practicing attorneys, and the more onerous the duties of the courts.
To meet the demand for relief from this situation, becoming
increasingly intolerable, the American Law Institute was organized in 1923, to simplify and clarify the common law, to make
it more adaptable to social needs, to promote scientific research
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upon legal problems, and to secure a more efficient administration
of justice. No other like undertaking since the days of Justinian
rivals the restatement in process of preparation. If it can be
made so as to give it the voice of authority, it will end much of old
conflict and search of authorities. It should simplify the process
of applying the law because the law applied itself will have been
simplified.
Though the institute did not at the beginning contemplate restating the criminal law, it has been determined that there are so
many inconsistencies and uncertainties in it that it too should be
included in the project. In view of the provision of the penal
code of this state that no act or omission shall be deemed criminal
or punishable except as prescribed or authorized by the code, our
direct interest in this phase of the work is only that which thoughtful citizens of one state naturally will have in the welfare of sister
states. Nevertheless, the clarifying of the law in those states
where the common criminal law still is wholly or partially in
effect, will have a wholesome influence upon the substance and
interpretation of penal codes.
Parallel with this movement is the growing realization that
the substantive law must be suited constantly to new needs as they
arise. We are moving away from the view that the law is static.
Industrial and political and economic conditions are in a state of
constant change, and with each shift in conditions come changing
conceptions of justice. Doctrines which are the appropriate products of one period to assure justice, in a later period are modified
or supplanted to avoid injustice. When promulgated they rest
upon public policy and later yield to other doctrines upon the same
consideration, for the preponderant opinion as to what is necessary to the well being of the race today will bear quite a different
emphasis tomorrow.
One aspect of this development is the steady growth of interest
in the law as a science. There is increasing resort to scientific
methods to add to the efficiency of the law by analysis of the
reasons for the more obvious of its short-comings. The crime
commissions and judicial councils recently organized are the most
apparent evidence of the tendency. As a whole the profession
turns more tolerantly, if not more eagerly, than formerly to discussion of the historical or philosophical aspects of the law. Endowments are sought to permit research concerning the problems
of jurisprudence. The new professional attitude is marked by
the open mindedness of the scientist which concedes always the
possibility of improving what exists, but which admits the new
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to supplant the old only when its soundness or fitness so to do is
demonstrated.
Though there are positive efforts to improve the basic thing
with which the administration of justice has to do, insofar as there
are shortcomings in applying the law, they are generally attributed,
not to the law itself, but to the media through which it is applied.
The odium for failures in administration is heaped upon the law of
procedure, and for the most part the legal reforms suggested-have
been calculated to simplify procedure and to facilitate the disposition of causes. Especial attention to the law of procedure has
seemed necessary because it has always been less adaptable to
change than the substantive law. A mark of social progress has
been the growth of substantive rights and these naturally have been
defined in the growing substantive law, but the law of procedure
has lagged behind it.
This incongruity between these two branches of law resulted
in the agitation so ardently begun by Jeremy Bentham, for a
revolution against the general failure of justice. An outgrowth
of this movement after long years of agitation was the adoption
by New York in 1848 of a code of civil procedure "to simplify
and abridge the practice, pleadings and proceedings of the courts"
of that state. A large number of other states adopted the same
or similar provisions, and others modified their procedure to suit
it to modem conditions. When the code idea was adopted it
was believed by its supporters that it would assure a simple and
punctual administration of justice and would satisfy the public
with the judicial system.
Though the original New York code had less than three hundred sections, by 1896 it had been so amended that it contained
nearly four thousand sections. We shall not pause here to consider the merits of the code system. It has served a great purpose, and has done much to strengthen public faith in our judicial
institutions and cannot be summarily cast aside. Nevertheless,
there still is complaint that the progress of litigation through the
courts is unduly impeded and that the way of the litigatant is
made devious and uncertain by the power of technicality.
Certain as it seems that the present situation can be materially
improved, there is at hand no ready-made scheme which insures
improvement. The agitation which led in this country to the
proposal of the code system, after much discussion, experiment,
observation and legislation, led in England to the adoption in 1873
and 1875 of the judicature acts, which swept away the system of
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common law pleading there more completely than the codes swept
it away here. These acts confer upon the supreme court the
power to make rules of court for the regulation of pleading,
practice and procedure in the several courts. The rules of judicial
procedure are framed by the courts and not for them. In support of such a system it is urged that the prescribing of procedure requires expert knowledge and can be more intelligently
done by judges than by a legislative committee composed in large
part of laymen; that defects of procedure can be more readily
cured under rules of court than under a procedural code, and
tha't the tendency of such codes, as their history shows, is to
fossilize as the common law procedure fossilized, unless the courts
themselves are authorized to adapt them to new conditions.
Whether rules of court under conditions here would prove to be
all that is claimed for them, no one knows. We do know that
the power to prescribe the procedure in equity cases in the federal
courts is being successfully exercised by the supreme court and
that there is strong sentiment for placing in the court the same
power with respect to cases at law. Concededly, there are arguments in favor of granting such power with reference to practice
in the federal courts which do not apply with equal force to practice in the state courts. The power also has been conferred upon
the supreme courts of Washington and Ohio and of other states,
and no doubt will soon be given a trial. Visitors to England are
loud in their praise of the directness and speed and effectiveness
with which the courts there function, and much of the credit for
their efficiency is attributed to the judicature acts. But again it
must be noted that the conditions and atmosphere existing there
differ radically from those existing here.
In considering any proposed reform we must bear in mind that
a system peculiarly adapted to conditions prevailing in one country
or state will not necessarily succeed equally well under conditions
existing in another country or state; that the most admirable of
exotics often fail in strange environment, and that whatever defects may exist in our codes of procedure, their meaning has been
made definite by judicial determination, while rules of court would
open new fields of litigation. On the other hand, the profession
should recognize any shortcomings of the system under which we
live and practice and look with tolerance upon the proposal of
changes fruitful elsewhere of efficiency and commendation. We
can well afford to refute our professional reputation of blind adherence to precedent and hostility to innovation. We shall not
want to align ourselves with those of our earlier brethren who
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first received the code idea as a "barbarian invasion" and were
contemptuously dubbed "sons of Zeruiah."
While the idea of substituting rules of court for codes has received tremendous impetus and bids fair in the end to prevail,
there is much which may be done to make the existing system
more effective. Proposals at least worthy of investigation are a
summary judgment act to meet the habitual interposition of answers solely for delay; the trial of cases to the court without a
jury unless a jury trial is demanded; the placing of causes upon
the calendar without notice of trial; the examination of jurors by
the court; the reduction of the time for appeal; verdicts by a
majority of the jurors; more frequent final disposition of cases
by the appellate courts and other provisions with which there has
been experience elsewhere.
The apparent breaking down of criminal justice in some sections of the country has centered attention upon criminal procedure. Provisions for keeping statistics of crime in the several
states are so inadequate that it is impossible to determine definitely
to what extent the criminal law is failing. There is much diversity
as between jurisdictions in the definitions of a number of the
principal crimes. Despite these facts we are reasonably sure
that there is more crime in this country in proportion to population than there is in England or Canada, that a much larger proportion of those who commit crimes are not apprehended in this
country as compared with the other two countries, and that a
larger proportion of those prosecuted for crime here escape conviction and punishment than in those countries. Whether this
be true or not there can be no doubt that too many of those who
commit crimes are not apprehended and if apprehended are not
informed against or indicted, that too many of those indicted are
not tried, and that of those tried too few are convicted. While the
crime situation which has been discussed so much elsewhere seemingly has not changed for the worse in this state, we nevertheless
are concerned with the general problem, and no one would claim
that there may not be improvement here.
The condition of which complaint is made is attributed, according to the inclinations of observers, to divers causes, ranging from the hip flask to the waning of religious faith, from childhood complexes to the Bedouin existence of the modern American,
and from the foreign element in our population to glandular defects. However, investigations by students and committees and
commissions without exception have resulted in stress upon defects in criminal procedure and in the suggestion of numerous
changes in it. Among these are the following: that the infor-
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mation or indictment be reduced to its simplest form; that its
amendment be permitted to obviate the delay incidental to technical
error; that admission to bail be made more difficult; that the
number of peremptory challenges for the state and the defendant
be made the same; that the issue of insanity be raised in the plea
of the accused; that this issue be determined by experts selected by
the court; that the right to change of venue from both the judge
and the county in misdemeanor cases be taken away; that the
rights of the state with reference to change of venue be the same
as those of the defendant; that comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify be permitted; that the trial court function as
a judge rather than a moderator, and express his opinion regarding
the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses; that the
waiver of jury trials in felony cases be permitted; that the state's
right to appeal be enlarged; and that the time for appeal he reduced and the hearing thereon promptly held.
To one trained in existing criminal jurisprudence, some of
these suggestions seem like hazardous innovations which would
strike at the rights of one accused of crime which are held so
sacred. It should be observed, however, that intelligent judgment upon such proposals must take into account the historical
background of the existing substantive and procedural criminal
law. When the criminal procedure, which still for the most part
obtains in our several states, was shaped nearly two hundred
offenses were punishable by death. The trial methods of English
prosecutors and judges in the seventeenth and early part of the
eighteenth centuries, and the use of the criminal law as an agency
of religious persecution, were so vividly remembered that the primary problem in the formative days of our national and state
governments was the protection of persons accused of crime
against oppression. In consequence stringent provisions were
adopted to protect the accused against unfair trials. The cumbersome machinery of the common law was provided to safeguard the
liberty of the individual, -the trial courts were shorn of powers possessed in England, and unusual powers were conferred upon juries.
Judicial justice had not yet been developed, and there was need
of protection against the oppression of royal governors and judges.
Now the old tendency to oppress has passed away. In the substantive law the interests of society are receiving quite as much
emphasis as the rights of the individual, yet this change has not
been reflected by corresponding changes in criminal procedure.
But we need not pause to appraise any suggested change either
in civil or criminal practice. We should not agree in any speculative appraisal were it undertaken. What is needed is a scientific and judicial analysis of alleged defects in our fortnis of prac-
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tice both civil and criminal, consideration of their historical reason
for existence, thorough investigation of the experience in other
jurisdictions with any proposed changes, and a suiting of the
remedies to the needs existing. The haphazard amendment of
statutes and instruction by laymen and pseudo-lawyers of the
courts as to how they shall perform their duties, has proved fruitless of everything except confusion and the addition of impediments to the prompt and efficacious administration of justice. To
deal with the problem, judicial councils have been created in some
jurisdictions. The organization of such councils is rapidly passing the stage of experiment. The effect of the regulations recommended by the conference of senior circuit judges, which constitutes the federal council, upon the dispatch of business in the
federal courts, has been most wholesome. The first report of the
Massachusetts council is so searching and judicial as to inspire
confidence in the new departure. Like bodies in other states no
doubt will prove as effective and painstaking in their work.
The shaping of the law and the means of its administration
is a function of the expert. We have too long left it in the hands
of the novice. When there is within the profession a readiness to
deal with the law as the profoundest of the sciences and a sincere
desire to have it administered and applied to human affairs with
the greatest conceivable efficiency, we may expect a deeper regard for the legal expert and his recommendations. But if the
profession concerns itself chiefly with a use of the law and its processes as a means of making a livelihood and with an adherence to
precedent because it is that and because it involves less effort than
the application of legal principles in the light of advancing knowledge, we need not expect much faith in the calling nor departure
from the all too prevalent thought that since the law affects all
citizens, any of them are qualified to help make it or to pass judgment upon proposals for its change.
The supreme and district court judges of the state in a recent
meeting acted as a temporary judicial council and considered
means of improving the service of the courts, but this group is
not so constituted that it can make continuous critical study of
judicial administration. There is need of a body of judicial
efficiency experts who can give precedence to the consideration
of our own procedural problems, study the effectiveness of the
administration of courts in this state, and determine the respects
in which it requires improvement and the means suited to the
peculiar situation existing by which the needed improvement
probably may be most successfully wrought.
Such investigating bodies as the Missouri Association for
Criminal Justice, the Chicago Crime Commission, the Cleveland
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Association for Criminal Justice, and other like bodies have made
and are making valuable contributions not only to the study
of causes of crime, but to plans for their removal. If such organizations consisting so largely of nonprofessional members and
engaged in so difficult and serious an undertaking can function so
effectively, how much more may we expect an improved administration of the law under the guidance of experts especially delegated to study the defects in the processes by which it is required
to be applied.
So long as results are not what they are desired to be, it is
natural to lay blame, and perhaps to attach unwarranted importance, to practices now in vogue, but in passing it seems
pertinent to suggest that often the ends of justice would be more
adequately served if the procedure we already have and the
processes we daily use were more effectively invoked by those responsible for their administration. Consideration of this phase
of the general subject, however, belongs under the discussion of
the third factor, the judiciary.
To so large an extent does success or failure in the administration of justice depend upon the judiciary that the public readily
ascribes many apparent shortcomings to the courts. Much criticism to which they are subjected is unwarranted, but obviously
there are respects in which their functioning can be improved. In
the old common law courts the trial judge was a judge in fact
whose opinion upon the evidence was deemed as important and
essential a factor in arriving at a verdict, as was the opinion of the
jury. He was one of the triers of fact. The general stripping
of the trial judge in this country of such power is an interesting
chapter in our judicial history, a knowledge of which is needed
perhaps to pass judgment upon the proposal that we reinvest him
with his former power.
Judicial power by the constitution of this state is vested in the
supreme, district and inferior courts. It is not granted to them.
The district court is a trial court. If the constitution in securing
to the people of the state the right of trial by jury contemplates
a common law jury, as the supreme court has held, the trial judge,
in the absence of contrary provisions naturally should be a court
with the prerogatives of a common law judge. We are satisfied
to leave with such a judge the authority to find facts in equity
cases or in cases in which jury trials are waived. If he is wise
and just enough to find the facts on one side of his court, it must
be safe in theory at least to entrust him with the power to comment on the facts on the other side. Instead, by virtue of the
statutory curbing of his power, he refrains from doing the very
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things which his experience and knowledge should particularly
qualify him to do.
Then there is an executive side to judicial administration
which is commonly overlooked. In spite of limitations upon
the judicial function the trial judge very often might do more to
dispatch business and to discourage the dilatory tactics which
so frequently postpone the disposition of causes and bring reproach both to the bench and the bar. No matter how nearly
perfect the procedure prescribed it will be powerless to remedy
defects unless effectively used. Slipshod methods are just as
disastrous in transacting judicial business as they are in the domain of commerce.
Then too, the quality of the justice administered depends somewhat upon the capacity, integrity and judicial attitude of those
holding judicial office. Adequate salaries, reasonably certain tenure of office, and removel of the office from the temptations of
politics, are conducive to the development of general fitness for
the position.
No doubt the success of the British and our own
federal courts may be traced as much to the stability and authority
and dignity of the judicial office in these jurisdictions as to any
differences in the procedure. If this be true the increase of
judicial terms and salaries and the bringing about of other conditions which will contribute to judicial poise are essentials to a
greater administrative efficiency in the courts.
While the increasing trial of civil cases at law without the
aid of the jury is proving economical and satisfactory, and may be
expected to gain favor, and the experience of the states of Maryland and Connecticut and of the city of Milwaukee, where criminal cases, including felonies, are tried to a single judge or a group
of judges, has the earnest commendation of lawyers and citizens
familiar with it, a survey of this character cannot disregard the
jury as an indispensable part of the trial court system. An institution so thoroughly ingrafted in our jurisprudence as the trial
jury will long be cherished as a safeguard of individual and property rights. But in the interests of a better administration of the
law it may well be questioned if there should not be qualification
of some character except citizenship for jury service, or if there
should not be provision for the exercise of more rigid scrutiny in
making selections for it so as to choose those best qualified for the
duty by training and experience. The criticism of the jury system
would be minimized if our usual resourcefulness were applied to
making it function more effectively.
For the present the appellate courts seem to be spared the bitter
criticism which at times has been directed at them. In fact there
has been gradual but notable departure by them from emphasis
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upon the technicalities so obnoxious to the public. In most
jurisdictions now the courts are sufficiently progressive to take
cognizance of such changes in need and thought as dictate variance
from the letter of precedents. The present day inclination is indicated in the following language from a recent case: "The time
has come when mere refinement of pleadings should not be invoked as a subterfuge for the escape of manifest violators of the
criminal law. An indictment should not be quashed because it
does not happen to be couched in that technical language and form
required by the courts in pleading when the law required the infliction of the death penalty for stealing a sheep or imprisonment
for life for what now may be called a misdemeanor." And what
is said with reference to technicality in the criminal practice is being more generally applied with reference to forms, procedure, and
rules of evidence in the civil practice. By virtue of their usual
supervisory powers over inferior courts and a heeding of complaints indiscriminately made against all courts, they can do still
more to reinstate the judiciary in public favor by making justice
more speedy. Reforms designed to help make their decisions
final in a larger percentage of cases so as to avert new trials are
worthy of serious investigation. And not the least important of
the changes they alone can effect is the shortening of their
opinions to conform to the efficiency ideals of the day.
But inseparable from the place of the courts in giving effect
to the law is the part played by the legal profession. What the
practicing lawyer too often forgets is that his function is to aid
and not to hinder the courts; that in theory his objective is to
secure justice for his client, and not victory at any price, and that
when he yields to the seductive spell of the lucre offered for advantage without regard to honor he prostitutes the profession
which his life and service should exalt.
Though perfection is not to be expected in those of our calling
any more than in those engaged in any other pursuit, the trend is
in favor of a raising of the general level of the profession. For
at least fifty years there has been a movement in the direction of
more thorough qualification for admission to the bar. Professional schools have raised these prelegal requirements and have
increased the length of the professional courses. The high standard prescribed by the American Bar association as reasonable
and desirable has been adopted in a number of states. While in
this state it has not yet seemed wise to adopt such standard, the
general raising of requirements in the schools and elsewhere reflects itself in the constantly improving character of candidates
for admission to our bar. We are the beneficiaries of the steady
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change in the general situation, and no doubt in time it will seem
advisable to prescribe the higher standard.
While there always are exceptions to what seem unvarying
rules, the general education of a practitioner may reasonably be
expected to bear a definite relation to the character of the service he will render to society as one of those responsible for the
administration of justice. The more readily a lawyer can perceive
the significance of the social and economic movements of his time,
the more helpful he can be in giving the basic principles of the law
new vigor and meaning by their adaptation to what hitherto has
been foreign to the law. The broadening vision of the profession
to which reference already has been made is a distinct advance.
The very cause of our common criticism has been the general belief that lawyers have their faces to the .past. With the growing
view that the law is in a state of constant flux, there is developing
a more constructive profession.
But not only is there demand within the calling for a higher
degree of fitness for it, but for greater fidelity to professional
honor. ' The obligations of lawyers to their clients have long been
clearly defined, but breach Of these has not always met the official
reproach which it has merited. Men with professional pride always deprecate the manipulations of the shyster, but they have too
commonly borne the disgrace heaped upon the calling as a whole
on account of his delinquencies rather than to bring him to bay.
In these later days with their emphasis upon ethics in business
relations there is evident growing exaction as regards professional conduct. With higher standards of professional fitness,
greater interest in moulding the law to the current needs, and
more rigid adherence to ethical requirements, the bar will contribute materially to more effective service by the courts.
The final factor to be considered is the public. The courts,
the legal profession and judicial procedure have been under the
condemnation of what we rather loosely denominate "public
opinion." Strangely enough no other factor has more to do with
the state of the administration of justice than this collective
thought. The individual citizen could not evade his constant contact with the law and the effect- of its application if he would.
It guards his life and his property. Under our system the public
chooses its lawmakers and at times legislates directly. It elects
executive and judicial officers who, where the right of recall
exists, hold their terms subject to the popular will, and from its
ranks come jurors and litigants. The public then is not an innocent bystander impartially observing the law in process. It is a
party to its administration and the law which is applied and the
effectiveness with which it is done on the whole will be about
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what the public demands. It will not reach absolute justice,
but its administration will approximate what the conditions which
the public has made will permit.
It therefore is from the public that complaint of defects will
come and it is its demands which obviously there is effort to
satisfy. But without its help there can be no improvement and
without expert guidance of its opinion its efforts to help with the
problem will be futile. In most of the code states there has been
an inclination to seek added efficiency of the courts in the legislative increase in the details of procedure. The inevitable consequence is quibbling over the non-essentials so universally disapproved. While such measures are intended to serve the ends of
justice, they in fact are retrogressive. They mean a procedural
tendency in the direction whence we have come. In the main they
are the gropings of the inexpert. There is no need that methods
so fruitless be continued when those fitted by training to devise
remedies for defects in the law or practice are engaged in a great
movement to make courts more efficient and when the courts and
the bar are shaping and urging the adoption of definite proposals
to remedy the very shortcomings with whose nurture they have
been charged. The law is as much a science as is medicine or engineering, and the recommendations of the profession as to procedural questions should be accepted as readily as the views of
physicians or engineers are accepted upon the technical problems
touching their respective professions. Disregard by legislative
assemblies of these recommendations will mean a defect of the
very ends cherished and sought by all lovers of justice. No doubt
the public will yield to the views of the profession in this field
if fully informed of the plans designed to assure greater judicial
effectiveness, and convinced of a genuine purpose to achieve such
end.
Then too the public has a direct responsibility and duty with
respect to crime. Prosecuting and police officials will be as vigilant in the discharge of their official duties as the public to which
they owe their choice dictates. The public view again will reflect
itself in the verdicts of juries. What is considered a serious offense in one community in another may be indulged, and the
views in each will be manifest by the attention paid to prosecutions of the offense and the results obtained. Some failure in enforcement is due to incapacity of public servants charged with enforcement and suggests the need of remuneration and insistence
upon professional qualification commensurate with the official
responsibility imposed.
But not all the fault can be laid at the door of enforcement
officers or defects in procedure. There is too much indifference
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of the public to observance of the law. Individualism has been
rampant through our national history. Always there has been
and is a stressing of individual rights. Ratification of the federal
constitution was well nigh defeated because it contained no bill
of rights. While there is no condonation by the public of crime
as such, the emphasis, in case of trial for crime is always upon
the rights of the accused. This emphasis accounts for the prevalence of the technical interpretation of criminal statutes and of
statutes defining our criminal procedure taken from England,
though the historical reason therefore existing in England does
not exist here. Still more important is the fact that this individualism is manifest in defiance of the law when its provisions
do not meet the approval of the offender. There is general
hostility toward restraint. The idea of individual liberty as the
term is generally interpreted, is not compatible with submission to
it merely because it is imposed by law. The rights of the individual too often are deemed more sacred and important than the
rights of society. The public opinion demanding enforcement of
the law, if consistent, will also insist upon its observance.
Changes in criminal procedure and a more prompt disposition
of criminal cases are to be desired, but a healthy public opinion
which is willing to brand and deal with a violation of law as a
crime is just as much to be desired. With such an opinion supporting police and prosecuting officers after the commission of
crime more offenders will be apprehended. If such an opinion
surrounds the courts in the trial of criminal cases more of the
accused will be convicted. And if there is more general regard
for the rights of society after conviction, the punishment measured
out to criminals will be more nearly commensurate with their offenses. Better citizenship is inextricably interwoven with the
better administration of justice.
Out of all the welter of agitation for improvement, the study
of conaitions, the plans for restatement of the law and other reforms, and the higher level of the profession, there is bound to
come a more effective and satisfying administration of the law.
But as members of the bar we can not sit complacently by and
expect the evolution of greater efficiency unless we contribute to
the evolving process by our individual and collective efforts to
improve the existing order. The end sought is neither novel nor
unreasonable. Means proposed for reaching it may be impracticable or premature, but if they are found to be so, other means
can and will be devised. The judicial branch of government is
no less efficient than are the executive and legislative branches
but reforms in all departments are under way. Because of their
professional aspects, it is to be expected that the bar will lend
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special aid to bring the movement for greater effectiveness in the
administration of justice to wholesome fruition.
VIcE-PRESIDENT MCINTYRE: We have all listened with a
great deal of pleasure and advantage to the paper of our president.
MR. NOSTDAL: I move you that the address of the president
be received and printed in the minutes and that the recommendations contained in the address be referred to the committee on
legislation.
The motion was duly seconded and carried.
PRESIDENT YOUNG:
(After various announcements.)
meeting will stand adjourned until two o'clock p. m.

AFTERNOON

The

SESSION

9, 1926
2 :oo p. m. President C. L. Young, of Bismarck, presiding.
PRESIDENT YOUNG: I think it quite fitting that the chief
justice of one of our well-known courts should be introduced by
the chief justice of our own court, so I present Chief Justice
Christianson, who will introduce the speaker.
SEPTEMBER,

CHIEF JUSTICE CHRISTIANSON:
Members of the bar, ladies
and gentlemen: All of you here, I think, know that generally
the law may be divided into two classes; one for the prevention
of wrongs and one in which you seek vindication for a wrong.

Criminal law has formerly been looked on as a system for
punishing the offender. As far back as we read we hear of "An
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." In recent years, though,
men and women have come to realize that the best way to deal
with the crime situation is to seek to prevent it, at least it is one
of the essential ways to deal with the situation. There is perhaps no subject on which there has been so much stuff said and
written as there has been on the so-called crime wave and crime
situation. Those who have not had the slightest thing to do with
the enforcement of law, who have not been inside a penal institution to study, have not had the slightest hesitancy in bursting into
print. Take the newspapers outside of the Minneapolis Journal
and they used to have the whole paper full of men whose names
were unknown even in the community where they lived but they
had no question but that they had the supreme wisdom that would
enable them to cope with the question that humanity has struggled
w ith from the beginning of time.
Among the men who have spent years of study, not merely in
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theoretical abstractions, but in practical contact with the administration of criminal law, is the man who is about to address you.
He has devoted to it the best years of his life. He is one of the
men who has been able to change his views, as he admitted this
morning in talking to the judicial committee up here that he did
as he got further light on the subject. He is here at the invitation
of the bar association of this state to give to us a discussion which
is the result of his high standing, court activity for years and
years, and careful study and consideration. He believes that one
of the good ways to deal with the criminal situation is to prevent
it, not alone to aid it until some young life has been taken and then
punish the offender, because by doing that you can not restore the
life that is gone. He will talk to you on the subject of human
destiny and I am sure that when you have heard it you will
realize that the destiny of humanity lies in human hands, and that
the Almighty has placed it there, and it is up to us to work it out
ourselves.
It is a peculiar pleasure and privilege to present to this
audience one who is deeply interested in the subject and has
come here because it wants to hear from a man who knows what
he is talking about-it is a pleasure to present Chief Justice Harry
Olson, of the municipal court of the city of Chicago.
Members of the North DaCHIEF JusTIcE HARRY OLSON:
kota Bar association, ladies and gentlemen: I should much prefer in a general audience like this, to talk to you extemporaneously
on this subject this afternoon, but I feel that an extemporaneous
address runs down too many blind alleys and I have come too fa r
to make a general extemporaneous address. I cannot cover the
ground that I should cover when I do, so I ask you to bear with
me now and at the banquet I shall talk to you extemporaneously,
but I am afraid somebody will print it and I have got to have it
as it should be.
This is a highly controverted subject. I happened to be on
the committee of law presided over by Elihu Root, who is working
on the reform of criminal prosecutions, and I called attention to
the preventative method rather than the punitive one. One of the
judges looked at me and I asked how long he had been on the
bench and he said he had been there four years. But then I read
an article of his and it showed that he had a purely academic
view.

